Abstract
Introduction
In P2P system, nodes are identified by pseudonym that communication nodes can not complete the authentication without stable identities [1] .The traditional access control technology can not be directly applied to the P2P environment. Eventually, P2P users face a variety of risk more serious than the tradition application, spam, computer virus, ID stealth, Pseudo spoofing [2] .
In recent years, the most research for trust evaluation is based on reputation model [3] .Wang and Vassileva propose a trust model based on Bayesian Network for P2P system [4] .Its reputation is built on the basis of recommendations. Considering the reputation and risk, Adams brings forward a node centered access control system for trusted distributed system [5] .The system stimulates mutual cooperation and resource sharing in mobile collaboration environment. EigenTrust proposed by Kamvar is a global trust model, which computers the local trust value according the history transactions. Global trust value is calculated by iterative trust to achieve probability spread of trust for each node [6] .Based on EigenTrust, [7] solves the problem about the existence of global trust value.
These models evaluate the node trust in same network; do not cover how to evaluate the trust value when the node joins another P2P system. In real P2P system, each node may own many pseudonyms and could join different P2P system with different pseudonyms. Trust is context sensitive; a trust object may obtain different trust value in different circumstance.
The structure of node-centered P2P network and the real human-centered social network have a high degree of similarity. A person often plays in social circle in different roles (multiple identities), and in different social circle tends to be different credibility. Social networks constrain people everyday behavior through trust between people and the incentive mechanism, such trust relationship is built on interpersonal interaction has occurred, is an assessment about the trust of the social object depending the experience.
Design Considerations
The relationship among pseudonyms, nodes and hosts in the P2P environment is shown in Fig  l. Nl and N2 are different P2P networks. Host p joins NI and interacts with node a, q through the pseudonym pl. Host q joins Nl, N2 simultaneously, interacts with node a, b, p with different pseudonym ql,q3 and q3 in Nl, interacts with node d through pseudonym q2 in N2, interacts with node c through pseudonym q2 and q3 in N2. The credibility of the node is closely related to the pseudonym. The credibility of the host p could be measured by behaviors related to pseudonym p1, while the credibility of the host q relates with pseudonym q1, q2 and q3. Most trust evaluation mechanism [4] [5] [6] [7] is essentially the trust assessment for pseudonym. For interactions between p and q, they calculate the credibility of q3 only from the perspective of p1 , or get recommended information from other nodes interacted with q3 (e.g. b1), without comprehensive consideration the impact of behavior of q1, q2 on the credibility of host q. Anonymity of P2P system has led to the problem because p can not get any information about relations among q1, q2 and q3 (all belong to host q) .
Based on the above, we propose a distributed host-based trust assessment mechanism: Pseudonym trust is assessed only by the behavior of the corresponding pseudonym (e.g. q3); the node trust is assessed by the behavior of all the pseudonym used by a host in the same network (e.g. q1 and q3); host trust is assessed by the behavior of all the pseudonym of the host which may be used in different P2P system (e.g. q1 , q2 and q3). For interaction between pi and q3, pseudonym pi as an evaluator calculates pseudonym trust, node trust and host of q in turn, eventually uses host trust of q as the credibility of the peer q3 to avoid the security risks brought by directly using q3 's pseudonym trust as credibility of the peer q3.
P2P TRUST MODEL BASED HOST
In this section, we show the approach to establish the stable identity with ring signature scheme [9] for the P2P host, and the comprehensive consideration of various factors on the credibility quantification. Let P is a set of nodes in a P2P network, H is a set of Trusted Platform built by TPM.
Stable identifier
Signer of DAA anonymous authentication uses pseudonyms as identities. We put forward a stable identifier generation method. The approach has no restrictions on the choice of node pseudonym.
Let L = (y1, y2, ..., yn) be public key list for an-node P2P system. The public and private key pair of node can be generated in the DAA Join phase, and be submitted to the Issuer to sign. Issuer ensures the public and private keys are submitted by legitimate TPM, and each node only submits one public private key pair. After verifying the key pair, Issuer publishes the public key list for ring signature. The complexity of ring signature is related to the size of the ring L. We assume that checks the link ability [12] between these signatures. If they are linked, this means that they are signed by the same TMP, otherwise, they are signed by different TPM platform. This process establishes the relevance of P2P nodes by use of ring signature scheme. This relevance can be an implicit stable identity, because the verifiers only know two or more pseudonyms created by the same TPM, but not sure which one TPM, ensuring the anonymity of P2P.
Storage and measurement of trust
The result of each interaction can affect the credibility of the node. We assume that every interaction between P2P nodes will have a mutual evaluation, according to the interaction result (success or failure).
For an interaction between nodes p and q, let 
Evaluation value reflects the views on transaction result from both sides. Each node uses the existing evaluation to calculate the credibility (trust) of the other nodes, and determines the trust relationship. Because of the large number of P2P nodes, so consider using a distributed storage structure [11] to store assessment information.
In this paper, after the completion of interaction, the node p makes the public part of ring signature of q as the keywords of Chord, mapping to the Chord node for storing the assessment information. So, all evaluation information about q will be stored at the same Chord node. Besides the evaluation value, sat(p, q) and unsat(p, q) should be recorded to calculate the total interact times. In practice, the evaluation value is given by a pseudonym on behalf of a P2P node, in order to establish stable identifier, the pseudonyms and ring signature should also be stored.
Global trust relationship
Generally, trust relationship is classified into direct trust and indirect trust; the former exists in interaction occurred between entities directly and the later generates through the recommendation In addition to the direct trust, indirect trust should also be counted. Indirect trust comes from recommendation information provided by the neighboring nodes from p (e.g. node k). At the meantime, the trust of node k should also be considered. Let 
So, the trust from p to q could be quantitative as
α adjusts the direct trust and indirect trust in the assessment of the status of the trust.
Host trust assessment
A P2P node could use a pseudonym to precede credit transactions, but use another to cheat. So all behaviors of every pseudonym should be counted for node trust assessment, and the result of trust assessment should reflect the positive (negative) effects impacted by effects/malicious behavior.
In specific applications, the trust value is assessed by a pseudonym of evaluators to establish the trust relationship with other entities. In order to facilitate the presentation, we do not separate the pseudonyms of an evaluator in following. In fact, the implementation of assessment in our trust model is independent to every pseudonym of an evaluator node indeed; each pseudonym of the evaluator will get the same assessment result.
Pseudonym trust
Definition of pseudonym trust: credibility of a pseudonym of a node in a P2P network. Let 
(1 ) ( , ) In (8),
, j p q Direct T not only includes the history estimate information between current pseudonym of the evaluator (e.g. pi) and q j , but also includes history estimate information between other pseudonym of p and q j . Algorithm 1 is the calculation approach for pseudonym trust.
Algorithm 1: h q is the storage node for the evaluation information about q, (X i , q j , sat (X i , q j ), unsat (x i , q j ), σ i ) is a record of evaluation information stored in h q , X i is the evaluator side pseudonym, q j is the evaluated side pseudonym of q, σ i is that ring signature of x i . p i is the current evaluator pseudonym of node p. p xi is a pseudonym of node ever interacted with the x i , F is a map from pseudonym to the host stable identity,
